Fresh Meat (and pictures!)

Me and Abu Zeckie, one of my interpreters, baking in the sun.

Been talking a lot about the bad and the frustrating recently, thought I'd try to hit some good stuff.

There is a new US unit I work with now. They are getting accustomed to the new area and doing discovery learning. It is a bit frustrating, as they ask a lot of questions, assume the worst of everything at times (as they should), and overly react to most instances. But that's ok, we did the same thing until we got our legs under us. The good part is that they bring a fresh perspective to the game, and they have already started to change a few things for the better. I have good hopes for many of the ideas; they are changing some of the things I didn't agree with that the old unit did. Those guys were great Americans, too- so far I have lucked out with coalition units. What is notable is that the new unit is a national guard unit, and they bring a different mentality to the area. Most of their soldiers are citizens who are policemen, firemen, business owners and employees on top of soldiers. They are older, which physically isn't a great thing, but this isn't an overly physical fight anymore. Their maturity and different approaches to problem solving is refreshing.

Our IA unit is taking a bunch of bad things off the street like this:

The IA brings the stuff they find back here. The problem is they let it pile up on our compound. The IA does not have any Explosive Ordinance Disposal units trained in our area, so they rely on Coalition. Where they found the 250kg bombs I have no idea, but there was a bunch of IEDs ready to go, frags, mortar rounds, and homemade explosive by the 5-gallon cans. A lot of it is stuff left over from the 2006-2007 civil/sectarian war, but it's still dangerous. In my first couple of months here, we got rid of a bunch of stuff, but they have been busy and found a bunch more bad stuff, including this:

It is a suicide vest. Homemade explosives and ball bearings. How anyone could be manipulated to strap on one of these is beyond me. But, we got a tip on this one last week, we did a raid and here's the results.

I'd love to be an EOD guy. Call me crazy, but I have always had a fascination with blowing stuff up. That's all our current EOD team does-- they go out every day and blow up stuff people find. And they get paid. I have to say if I was single with no attachments, I would resign my commission and enlist as an EOD guy.

I have even enjoyed progress with my Iraqi Brigade Commander. I figured out that instead of telling him what to do, I ask questions that help him draw his own conclusions. Getting him to commit to anything past a week is the current challenge. He is easily distracted by lots of flashy things. He has lots of ideas, but has trouble following through with them. At least it gives me something to do for the next couple of months.

That's about it. Hope you are well, and thanks for reading.

Ron

Memorial Day

In September of 1995, two guys from my tank platoon were killed while on their way to work. Charlie Barcia and Jonathan Phillips were both barely 21, and not much younger than I was. Neither was married, and both were brand new to the platoon. Charlie was my loader, and Johathan was the driver of the Platoon Sergeant's tank. Charlie was from Long Island, NY, and Johathan was from Missouri. Two good kids who, while not at war, still died in the service of their country.

We divided escort duties between me and my Platoon Sergeant. I would be the escort officer for Private First Class Charles Barcia, and Sergeant First Class Sievers would escort the remains of Private Johathan Phillips to his home. It is tradition in the military to ensure that remains of servicemembers make it home to their final post, and to ensure their service is appropriately honored. In my case, it was my duty to ensure the remains made it on the aircraft to New York, that they make it to the funeral home, and subsequently to the funeral and internment. On the morning of the trip, I met the funeral director in Killeen and inspected the remains, and then he took us to the Austin Airport where Charlie was loaded on the plane. I traveled in the Dress Green uniform, a formality appropriate to the task of ensuring honors were rendered. On my person I carried the folded flag that was to cover the casket, the same flag I would present to Charlie's mother. Several people looked, some stared. Older men seemed to understand what I was doing; younger generations looked awkwardly at me, as my appearance stuck out from the normal travler.

The trip did not go smooth. The airline lost Charlie in Atlanta; they nonchalantly could not confirm if he made the transfer from one plane to another. I remember angily asking the clerk at the gate counter "how could you lose my loader?!" I demanded they open the cargo hold and allow me to verify that he was in fact on the plane, and they complied. They did not understand the gravity of the situation, nor did they realize the disrespect they were showing. After I verified he was in the plane, the airline apologized and we were on our way again.

On the ground, I was assisted in New York by the Casualty Assistance Officer, a Sergeant First Class from the New York National Guard who was present at the notification of Charlie's next of kin. After we handed Charlie off to the local funeral director, he took me to my hotel and checked me in. The next morning we went to meet Charlie's parents. The meeting started off very tense; I think she initially blamed me for his death (which was a traffic accident). But I shared some pictures from the platoon, as well as some mementos the platoon sent, and the air lifted. After that, we went to the funeral home, where the family would see the remains prior to a week of visitations.

One of the rules to being an escort is that whenever there is a visitation, the escort must always be present. The escort is the first in the room and the last to leave. I stood quietly off to the side, and spoke to those who spoke to me. I stood for the duration, despite being offered a seat on many occasions. I felt it was more appropriate to stand, in honor of a guy who again, while not at war, died in service to his country none the less. Charlie was a good Soldier who had a bright future. It was evident by the volume of family and visitors he had that he was well-liked.

The funeral and graveside service at Cavelton National Cemetary followed several days of visitations. I rehearsed my line to Charlie's mother continuously the night before, and did everything in my power to choke out the lines: "On behalf of the people of a grateful Nation, I present to you this flag as a symbol of your Son's dedication and service." I added the comment that her son was a good Soldier and I was proud to serve with him. I stood, saluted the flag and walked away, trying to get as far away as possible before I lost my composure. They played Taps, and the honor guard fired a 21 gun salute.

Escorting the remains of Charlie Barcia home to his family remains the hardest and at the same time most rewarding duty I have done in my service as a Soldier. Since then, there are others who have passed, both deployed in combat and in garrison assignments in the States.

Less than a percent of the American population serves in the military. I hope you took some time to think about the cost of Freedom this Memorial Day. If not, please make it a point to visit a National Cemetary soon, and to pay respects to those who gave everything they had over our Nation's 230-plus years so you could enjoy a day off at the lake, with friends, at a barbecue, or relaxing with the family.

Thanks for reading.
Ron

Two Angry Theories

Angry theory/ number one: Our risk-averse Army stifles initiative and prevents us from us becoming bold, innovative leaders the Army says it wants because cannot/is afraid to handle the consequences. Policies and rules are good for establishing good order and discipline, but they do not consider individual environments. Division/Brigade/Battalion wide SOPs are necessary; some SOPs and techniques that are regional or theatre wide are needed in a general sense for good order & discipline and, if necessary, to make us modular with other units if we have to conduct an on order mission outside of our local AO with other coalition units. But situations are different in every area, and current “edicts from on high” are too restrictive and thus neuter the initiative of the leader on the ground.

Angry theory number two: Higher ups (“Those guys, ” “Brigade,” “Division,” etc) issue edicts/policies/”standard enduring guidance” because they think because our Army has a great deal of technology that is supposed to clarify the battlefield and deliver “Situational Awareness” to the high commander, therefore he/she believes they are better able to judge the current scene of what is happening on the ground. We have a system called Blue Force Tracker that uses GPS technology to show where equipment is on the ground; we have UAVs that provide a picture to a removed commander of what is happening on the ground. But the systems do not provide the “Situational Awareness” that removed commanders think they do: Blue Force Tracker only shows where the unit is, not what it is involved with, which direction it is looking, how many good guys are on the ground, or how many enemy soldiers it is facing. All it shows is an icon on a screen. UAVs show a soda-straw view of a moment in time and do little to capture the sights, smells, sounds, and feel of the moment, all necessary things that go into the intuitive/subconscious decision making process. All of our technology that is supposed to provide Commanders with full-time situational awareness (and our risk-averseness) prevents us from leading by feel. The Science of warfare overwhelms the Art of warfare.

Until we let go, we won't truly have "empowered free thinking leaders."

I read another Malcom Gladwell book (called "Blink"), and he again contributed to my theory. He uses a scenario of a wargame called Millennium Challenge, which was a wargamed experiment done in 2000. The scenario consisted of a rogue dictator gone mad who made overt threats to neighbor countries in a strategically important area of the world. On the ‘Blue’ side was the US with LOTS of technology, analytical decision making models, big staffs, and lots and lots of metrics, decision support templates and Science of War stuff. On the “Red” side was a retired Marine named Paul Van Riper who truly empowered his subordinate leaders and used decentralized execution to fight. His approaches were extremely innovative to the point where his lo-tech style mitigated the overmatch created by technology. His subordinates were not mired in information, and were able to see things much more clearly. The end result is he handily beat the Blue Force in the wargame. I enjoyed the book a lot and agreed with many of its conclusions.

I should have said this first, but I want to do something over here, but higher rules and regulations prevent me from doing it, even though if I did it, I would be more successful.

That quote “I have seen the enemy, and it is us” applies nicely.

Hope you are well- thanks for reading.
Ron

Major Steven Hutchison

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30752514/

America lost a patriot last Sunday. I knew this guy, but only for a very short time. He was in my Advisor class at Fort Riley, and he served as a Border Transition Team Leader in Basra along the Iranian border.

He was a remarkable guy with a fascinating story. He had served 20 years (including two tours in Vietnam) in the Army already and had retired. He had a doctorate in psychology, had run a business, and taught school. His wife died of breast cancer in 2006, so he went back on active duty. I can only hope to be in the shape he was at the age of 60. He had previously completed a tour as an advisor in Afghanistan, and requested a rapid turnaround to deploy again. The Army assigned him this time as a team leader for an 11-man advisor unit in southern Iraq.

He was pleasant to be around; the kind of guy who you always learn something from every time you interact with him.

America needs more Steven Hutchisons and fewer Kim Kardashians and Terrell Owens.

Farewell, Steve; thanks for your service.

"The Americans" Don't Get It (a bit of a rant)

Our parent US Brigade is in the midst of redeploying. In doing so, they are in a rush to have that last impact, that last OER (Officer Evaluation Record) bullet, that last "look at another great mission we did in Iraq." That's all well and good, but it has been a bit imposing lately.

Earlier this week I went to a breakfast meeting with the outgoing and incoming Brigade Commanders. The purpose of the meeting was to lay out the new and improved Division Idea to fix "Battle Command." (Battle Command is a western doctrine on how US units are commanded and controlled, and how Leaders see themselves, how they manage and process information, on the enemy, friendly forces, and the battlefield. US Battle Command also highlights how our Army uses technology.) The concept is to embed more Americans, US radios, and communications systems, none of which are available to the IA, in the Iraqi command posts to "help" them command and control their units. The US made the conclusion of "the IA can't effectively command and control their forces" based off of one operation executed in April.

I disagreed with the premise statement. The IA is effective in my area; they can command and control their units given the current threat. My IA Brigade Commander executes Battle Command with five cell phones, and he does a pretty good job of it. Does it meet the Western Standard? No. Should it? Nope; they ain't from the west. Is it perfect? Nope. But it is effective, and the Brigade Commander continues to evolve and develop, and so does his unit. I guess he's just not doing it as fast as "The Americans" would like.

Infusing more Americans and western technologies is not what they need. Call it what it should be called, which is a thinly veiled attempt to keep tabs on the IA and their "madness." (Artile 24 of the Bilateral Security Agreement signed between the US and Iraq requires all US forces to be out of 'cities' by 30 June.) If the Americans want to have an impact, if they want to fix something, fix logistics. IA logistics above Division level is broken. But logistics is boring, and we would rather fix problems that have quick and easy solutions so we can get more OER bullets and tabulate more instances and metrics of success. We value quantity over quality.

The US culture and mentality is that we have to fix things, and we have to fix them kinetically. We need to fix all the problems, and we need to fix them now. Every solution can be solved with technology and firepower, and if those don't fix it, we will throw money at it until it goes away, regardless of the later effects. And this is the reason why we are still here six years later, because our culture won't evolve.

I should say I respect the outgoing US Brigade Commander. He is a good guy. But we (the 10 or so MTT chiefs in attendance at the meeting) all brought up culture and how this western idea of Battle Command doesn't relate, and his response was that we were using culture as a "cop out" and that "we have to fix this problem before we leave." "I've been a Commander here twice now, and I get the culture thing." No sir, you clearly don't. Because one, we are still here after six years, and two, people who live with this culture every day are giving you feedback and you aren't lestening. At that point, everyone pretty much shut up; it was evident he didn't see the problem as we saw it, and he had already made up his mind on what he was going to to do (throw more technology and Americans at a culture that had no desire to operate that way).

Tonight my Iraqi Brigade Commander issued guidance tonight to conduct a series of clearance operations directed at targeting remaining pockets of insurgent activity over the coming weeks. He gave specific and detailed guidance to his staff on how he wanted it done, given his sources, recent events, his five cell phones, what the local populace is telling him, and his grand plan to bring sustaining security to the area. Sounds like he gets Battle Command to me.

Hopefully the new guy will get it. We'll see. Or Insh'alla, as the Arabs say.

This is the most frustrating job I have ever had. But it is also one of the most rewarding in a sense, in that I am receiving graduate level experience in negotiation, international relations, psychology, and even and sociology. It has humbled me in some ways. And it has made me both appreciate and hate my own Army and government at the same time.

Thanks for reading. Take care-
Ron

Funny thing about this job...

Been in a rut lately, and frankly there just hasn't been a lot to write about.

Except for this week.

Had a rock star moment this morning at the IA Brigade's targeting meeting. Targeting meetings are where we get together and talk about bad people. The IA battalion intelligence officers come, as do the IPs (when they aren't butt hurt or mired in drama of 7th grade level) and the IA Brigade Commander comes. Coalition forces also come by the truckload. We make them show slides (which they hate) and they won't talk about certain bad people who are aligned with certain groups 'because there are spies in this room' (again, more 7th grade drama). The IA generally doesn't like the meetings, but attendance and quality has improved, mostly because we willed it.

This morning, everybody showed up-- a good start. The Brigade Commander and the IP general had a meeting before the meeting-- an even better start. The real meeting started about 45 minutes late (somewhat normal). And at the end of the meeting, they announced they had agreed to exchange liaison officers to help share information.

Breakthrough. Huge. Been working on this for almost two months.

I was happy; the Coalition force Battalion Commander was happy; we were all smiles. It was a good morning. There was high fives and hot chow on the objective. I left feeling pretty good about myself.

Tonight we were supposed to have an Iraqi staff meeting; another little project of mine I have been working on is recurring meetings that are productive. I do better when the XO is here, but he is on leave this week. My team and I rolled up at 7:45pm, only to find out the meeting was cancelled. Damn. Setback.

So off I went to see the Brigade Commander to find out why. He was all upset; it seems one of his Battalion Commanders (who is not that great) had a disagreement with a local sheik, and in brief, they ended up getting the Division Commander involved, who made the incident waaaaaay more dramatic than it had to be. End result: The Division Commander locked up the sheik, and the implications are that the sheik's people will now target the IA, since the IA 'disrespected' the sheik. This goes back to the whole sheik system vs. elected governance theme throughout the blog. Even though the Brigade Commander had nothing to do with any of it, he is shamed because he couldn't handle his area. He said he would quit, he would resign, and he wanted to pack his bag and leave now, as he was "tired of being in this Division." All things said in the heat of the moment.

We (me, my Birgade Commander, his subordinate battalion commander, the Division Commander, his stooge, the Division MTT chief and a gob of interpreters) all sat in a very small room and sorted it out, along with the Coalition Battalion Commander on speakerphone. It was all way more dramatic than it needed to be, but pride was at stake. and pride is another reason why Arabs lose wars. The repercussions have yet to be felt; maybe there will be some, maybe there won't be any. Overall I found it entertaining, but then I remembered these guys will shoot at each other for pride reasons. I needed my interpreter to fill me in on the cultural pride stuff.

I have another story involving my Coalition Brigade Commander and a discussion of culture, but I'll save that one for perhaps tomorrow.

Hope you are well-- thanks for reading.

Ron

Updated mailing address

Due to some units shifting, we got a new mailing address for those who send stuff (which is very much appreciated!!!-

MAJ Ron MacKay
1-120 CAV 30th HBCT
25/17 IA MTT
FOB Mahmudiya
APO AE 09322

Hope things are well-- Take care!
Ron

A Grumpy Rut

Been in a bit of a rut for a week or so, caused by multiple events:

--I got sick. Not I have the sniffles sick, not I have the aches and a touch of fever, but really full blown evil I Ate Some Bad Iraqi Chow And Got The Mother Of All Food Poisionings food poison. It was so bad I went to the doctor. Twice.

--Sand storms: We are on Day three of icky sand storms. If you have never experienced a sand/dust storm, get a bucket of fine dust/dirt and dump it over your head. Make sure you get a lot in your eyes, nose, and mouth, but only after you have worked up a really good sweat. Ears too. Strap on 30 or so pounds of body armor, then keep a couple of hot air hair dryers on you all the time. When you get back from patrol, then clean your entire house three times a day to try to keep the dust out of ruining the electronics. It's sort of like that.

--The realization we still have five and a half more months to go. Five and a half months is a long time. And it's getting ready to get really really hot.

--A bit of frustration with the IA: We are kind of at a dead end, and we are not sure where to go from here. What we are telling them isn't sticking lately. They seem in a rut too. Is this just the relationship running its course? Has the novelty worn off? Are the Americans not that great anymore?

But then two things happened today: One was a fairly invasive Ministry of Defense Inspection. It lasted three days, and the outbrief was tonight. The Brigade did ok. Immediately following the outbrief, the Brigade Commander (the guy I advise) gathered his staff in a room and issued detailed guidance to fix all of the deficiencies. It was refreshing, particularly in that most of the stuff he found out was wrong was organizational changes and stuff we have been recommending to him and his staff to change for a couple of months now. Vindication sometimes tastes good.

The second one was this: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30594331/ It was a bombing at a vegetable market just north of us. We drive through there all the time (don't worry, none of us or any of our units were hurt). They are capable; they just got banged in the nose, and now the effort of influencing the IA out of complacency and into action goes on. (NOTE: This singular bombing does not indicate a change in security of our area; it represents a singular attack on a complacent unit to our north, and the Iraqis already know who is responsible.)

With these two events, suddenly we are back in the game. I guess we'll get up tomorrow and get after it.

Hope you are well-- take care and thanks for reading.
Ron

Cropper and Bucca

Camps Cropper and Bucca are where the US held people they believed were involved in 'nefarious activities' in Iraq. I have no doubt there are bad people in there, but they were held without trial, some for a number of years. The two camps became a sort of 'Gladiator Academy' for terrorists; while they were detained, these guys networked, shared intelligence, and spread information and successful techniques. Again, I have no doubt there are bad people in there, and they are there for all the right reasons.

As a part of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) signed by the Government of Iraq and the United States, the US is no longer allowed to detain or hold Iraqis without approval from the Iraqi Government. Both the IA and Coalition Forces need a warrant to detain now (and this is good). But the SOFA said we also were no longer allowed to operate detention camps or hold people without process. Theater Internment Facilities like Bucca and Cropper were no longer legal. We had two options: One, hand the Iraqis the keys to the jail and sign over the entire place to them and let them hold trials, or two, set the prisoners free, with a mild apology. Guess which idea won out.

Starting in January, the US has been purging these jails little by little each month. The detainees are moved to the point of capture, and if no one makes a claim against them, they are set free, providing a guarantor (someone from their tribe) vouches for them. It is my opinion that this is the second biggest mistake of the war to date, with the first one being the Provisional Coalition Authority disbanding the Army in 2003.

We give the option to allow the IA to obtain a warrant ahead of time. But, as we have never done this before, the rules of releasing are being written as we go, which frustrates the IA. What worked last month may not work this month. We make the IA adhere to rules, like you can't re-detain without a valid warrant, but we don't really describe what warrants are valid, as there are many different courts and types of warrants here in Iraq. Ironic we now enforce these rules, as for six years we detained people with no legal process.

I guess you can do that when you win.

Make no mistake: We are putting some bad dudes back out on the street. I don't think that is right either. Maybe a better way would have been to show the IA how a legal system is supposed to work and put the detainees through an efficient judicial system that determines guilt or innocence. I think we took the easy way out on this one, in an effort to make it go away quickly, and the Iraqis will end up paying the price.

Again-- These are my opinions, not the Army's official position. It has been a frustrating week, having to explain this continual change in process to my counterparts, especially when I don't think it is right. This is what I call selling sand to the Iraqis.

Hope you are well-- thanks for reading.

Ron