Nonlethal Targeting Part II

So we had another meeting today to talk about nonlethal targeting, and how being nice to a neighborhood and improving some of the neighborhood's civil capacity can work in your favor in terms of finding bad guys and stopping crime and terrorism.

In a nutshell, the idea we conceived on 1 September went by way of apathy on down the road.

We pretty much had the same meeting with the Brigade Commander as we did on 1 September. We told them back at the first of the month we are in a position to help with some wells (cost about $10,000 each) and perhaps four generators that can power the neighborhood when the city power is inoperable. All the IA had to do was give us grids to where they think the wells should go, and make the plan to put in the wells, and pick up the trash.

The meeting started out with the US Battalion Commander attempting to engage the IA Brigade Commander on nonlethal targeting initiatives. The IA Commander kept steering the conversation back towards names of bad people, and efforts he is making to arrest those responsible for some recent attacks in his area, which falls in the lane of a lethal targeting meeting. Finally, the US Commander posed a directive, pointed question to the IA Commander: Are we going to do this or not?

The IA Commander answered with ambivalence. The US Commander (mustering A LOT of patience) said ok, and then told the IA Commander he was done with the meeting and he left.

I have to wonder if I was an Iraqi guy, and someone offered me free stuff to improve a neighborhood, I would think that would be a good thing to take advantage of. It highlights a couple of things:
1) My experience has told me that Arabs are reactive, mostly because being proactive is too much work and too hard.
2) Arab Pride is raring its head in Iraq. Maybe we are showing them up, and the people know it, and the IA is embarrassed by the US force's capabilities. Today two IA Soldiers got shot by a car at a checkpoint and the car sped off. The IA wanted me to ask my Battalion for cameras at all of the checkpoints. I said, why don't you just train the IA better and teach them to be more alert? The Brigade G2 (Intelligence officer) said the IA soldiers are indisciplined, and not like the US Army. "Your Soldiers are good -- they stay in uniform and have discipline" he said. I almost told him two things (for the record, I don't like this guy and I think he is a sorry officer):
Poor choice #1: "That's why your country keeps losing wars"
Poor choice #2: "Maybe your Soldiers are lazy because your leadership is lazy."

I held my comments and said nothing. But it highlights a point: I really don't think they care, and they are content with the current level of violence in the country, because stopping it and improving the country is too hard. This is a pessimistic statement, but I can't help but think that way. These opinions are also symptoms of a tour that is almost to an end. Events like today's rebuffed opportunity by the IA make me think that way. The only time this country has enjoyed relative stability is when it had a ruthless dictator in charge of it (Saddam).

I don't know what will happen to this country after we leave. I'll talk about some theories in a later entry.

Hope you are well. Take care.
Ron

A long week

So we had this big storm last Saturday night: One minute it was a cool 90 degrees in the evening, and the next this 40-50mph wind comes out of nowhere and blows stuff all over the place. Then it rains. Not a lot, but it rained, and thank God, as it cleared out a lot of the dust in the air. One of the casualties was our network, along with our AFN TV dish. The first priority was to fix the AFN dish so we could watch Texas vs Texas Tech. The internet took a week to get fixed, but it's back. Amazing how much work you can get done when there is no internet...

Here we are at 11+ months. Our replacements are in theater, and they are finishing up their training. Progress at a snail's pace continues. This week we had a meeting that included the Iraqi Police, some Ministry of National Security guys (an Iraqi version of a sort of internal CIA, and man, they are paranoid), and the Eid al Fitr holiday which brings Ramadan to a close. With Ramadan finally over, the IA is ready to get back to work. Well, as close to work as they get.

My daughter also turned 12 this week. Happy birthday, Sluggo.

Texas won again, and the Hogs lost. Again.

It's been an interesting year. I hope in the coming posts to make some conclusions and wrap some stuff up, as long as the connection holds.

Just wanted to put something up to let you know I'm still here.

Take care, and thanks for reading.

Ron

A Rock and a Hard Place Part II: Unintended Consequences of The Gimme Gimme

Long story short, in my opinion we missed an opportunity to exercise the IA logistics system. The background for this post is a couple of posts down in the blog.

The IA continued with their project, although unsupported by their logistics system. I was able to get them to request logistical support from their Division in the form of a properly filled out logistics request form-- a HUGE feat that took almost 11 months to get a form filled out right. My IA Brigade did what they were supposed to do. True to form, the Division did nothing with it, though, and the request went unfilled. I got an earful of 'I told you so.'

The God did provide though; this time The God took the form of a US Brigade and Battalion who gave them stuff without making the Division use the IA system first. Instead of forcing the hand of Division (which is the root cause of the failure of the logistics system) to do the correct thing - use the Iraqi supply system - they asked the Americans because it was easier, and the Americans reinforced a bad habit by giving them stuff instead of using Tough Love. It seems the US units care more for the protection of the Iraqi soldiers than the Iraqi Division Commander and staff.

The unintended consequences: I played hardball with my Iraqi Brigade by telling them my US Brigade issued an order that I wasn't allowed to give them stuff anymore, thereby removing my value (to a point). This bluff would have worked, if all the Americans would have stuck to the guidance they issued. The nonverbal messages I get from the Iraqis around my Brigade now is 'well, you can't give me stuff, they can-- what good are you to me?' so they are less inclined to heed our staff advice and our training recommendations. In effect, I have been a victim of fratricide by my own Brigade.

"I have seen the enemy, and it is us." --Walt Kelly

On September 11 2001, I was in command of B Troop 1-7 CAV at Fort Hood. We were preparing to go to Fort Polk to the Joint Readiness Training Center to serve as the heavy unit augmentation for the 327th Infantry of the 101st Airborne. We were in the midst of prepping all of our vehicles and equipment. We had an entire Troop's worth of equipment and everything it would need to live on for 30 days, because we knew the light infantry guys wouldn't be able to figure out logistics. We had everything but fuel and ammo.

It was about 8:30; I was in the chow hall getting breakfast after PT, and I think I was there when the 2d plane hit. It was all over the news. Pandemonium quickly ensued on post, and we were told we were an option. I think in hindsight, everybody thought they were 'an option.' Our rotation was cancelled because of a supposed other option for us. We were naive. We never went. The rest of my command until July 2003 was a roller coaster of rumors, 'prep to go' orders and 'stand by' orders. Units that did go flew over the New York City site on their way to Afghanistan- A visual image burned in their minds to remind them of what they were called to do.

The era of 'persistent conflict' continues today. We have done some things right, and some of the things we did weren't so right. I don't feel bad for Khalid Sheik Mohammed and others like him who are in GITMO. I know it's wrong to say this, but I really hate him for what he and others like him did, and I think I'd kill him if I had the chance. Extremist Islam is a mental sickness and is what is killing the Middle East; it threatens other parts of the world as well, fueled by poverty, ignorance, and oppression.

The good news is that Al Qaeda hasn't really won. Osama's Grand Caliphate has not come to fruition. For the vast majority of Americans, our way of life hasn't been that disrupted in the grand scheme of things. Al Qaeda in Iraq is still here, but every day they alienate people away from their cause. Sadly, I think most Americans have forgotten about 9/11, and they have relegated the task of vigilance (and vengeance, in some cases) to a small 1% minority of the Nation who serves in the military, and a slightly larger minority who serve and protect domestically.

I can say I have visited all three sites since the attack. Each one brings different emotions. I've also seen bad people here who subscribe to the same extremist Islamic ways. It is a real threat, but the threat won't be mitigated by killing all of them, nor will it be mitigated in the next 10 or so years. It will likely take a lifetime of changing attitudes.

A Rock and a Hard Place

I'm going to paraphrase a recent exchange concerning a problem I encountered that I'm in the middle of.

The IA recently made a decision to do something they can't support logistically, and are expecting US assistance with. Unfortunately, since these days we are in the business of transferring authority and responsibility to the IA, we aren't allowed to support them logistically any more, and they have to use the Iraqi logistics system, which isn't very user friendly and much harder to use than just asking the Americans.

This is a good policy. For too long US units used logistic capacity and capability to buy influence with the IA. Sometimes we use resources to get the IA to do things they wouldn't normally do-- call it a carrot and stick approach. Most American units will give whatever they have; they think it is the reason we are here, to make the IA more self-sufficient, which is true to a point. Unfortunately, there are unintended consequences to providing assistance, namely they just ask us for stuff instead of using their systems. Here is how my night went:

IA Commander: We need X, y, and X. So are you going to help us with our problem?

Me: Well, have you figured out what you need? How much of x, y and z do you need? Have you measured it out and do you have a plan?

IA Commander: We need a lot of assistance with this problem.

Me: Sure. But if you figure out exactly how much of each you need, you can request it through your channels.

IA Commander: (eye roll)

Me: You know, someday we are going to leave, and you guys are going to have to be self sufficient. You should start using your systems now so your guys are trained on them and know how to use them after we leave.

UNCOMFORTABLE PAUSE

IA Commander: I also need a map. Can I have your map? (I had a map I was using to show him some things)

Me: Saydi (Iraqi for Sir) I can't. The other day I was told I can't give you things any more, in an effort to energize your systems so they can be more efficient. You need to first figure out what you need-- how can you get things if you don't even know the specifics of what it is you need?

IA Commander: The God will provide. You will see.

I was at a loss for words. I often criticize the Western way of planning; we tend to overplan the crap out of things. Our huge staff sections overanalyze the problem, and our unwieldy staff processes are too big to be agile or effective. But this was the complete opposite of the spectrum. "Wing it" is an Iraqi doctrinal principle. Sometimes The God works it out for them. And when it doesn't, they just accept it and move on.

The bad thing is that eventually he will find an American who will say yes.

Take care.
Ron

Ranting on a soap box

http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/press-photo-lance-cpl-joshua-bernard-stirs-controversy/story?id=8494094

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/32693503/ns/world_news-south_and_central_asia/

Sorry, gotta vent. This news story got me going for a couple of reasons. Two points, one for releasing the photos, one against the media:

I think it is good for the people to know how much the 1% of those who serve in the Military are sacrificing for the other 99%. When you see the young 20-something kid wearing a uniform in the airport, tell them thank you. He or she will tell you it's no big deal, and they will blow it off, but it means more than you will ever know. It would be a better world if we stopped gushing over the Hollywood media attention mongrels and focused our efforts on real heroes. The world would be a better place if all of the high and mighty celebrities clammering for the spotlight (the Gosselins, the Kardashians, Paris Hilton, etc.) would all use some of their power and influence we give to them for good as opposed to wasting it on themselves. You can do something to show you care-- Donate to the USO and the Disabled American Veterans.

Our priorities are wrong. "DJ AM" died. I learned from the news he was a 'famous DJ' who was connected to a lot of celebrities. He lived through a plane crash, but then couldn't cope with life. Poor him, and so what? He died because he was addicted to drugs. What did he do to better his country or the world? He manipulated noise so people could have fun. Corporal Bernard and others like him died fighting the people who crashed planes into buildings in New York City, the Pentagon, and Shanksville, PA. (Note: If you have not yet visited all three of these places yet, you need to do so.) I'm sorry Michael Jackson died. He had some talents, but I don't believe the media should have paid all the attention to his family. During the time span between his death and his burial (25 June - 3 September), American families lost 120 sons, husbands, and brothers (and one woman/mother/daughter/sister) to combat in Iraq and Afghanistan (no women during this particular time span). The US Battalion I am attached to lost four on June 29th. But you didn't hear much about them.

I am not upset the pictures were taken. I am not upset at the photographer-- She was doing her job. I feel for the Bernard family; it should have been their choice to release the pictures, and the media should have honored the family's wishes. At least they waited until after he was buried. The real thing that gets me about this story is how the media makes themselves a part of the story. Somewhere along the way, the focus of this story went from CPL Bernard to the "anguish" the AP editors went through in deciding whether or not to publish the photo. Since when did the media covering a story become more important than the story?? (This is directed at the Anderson Coopers, Geraldo Riveras, and wold Blitzers of the media world.)

I better stop now. Rest in peace, CPL Bernard, and thank you for your service.

Non-Lethal Targeting

So as our Counterinsurgency Doctrine tells us, people are the center of gravity. Occasionally, we will 'target' the people by conducting an operation intended to generate information, or public support, or influence a particular demographic one way or another. These are now called non-lethal operations, or sometimes on a bigger level they are called Stability Operations, and they are a permanent part of our capability as a force. We haven't always done this; in fact when I was a Lieutenant, we used to joke about how we were too good for Operations Other than War as they were called at the time. We now do Stability Operations quite a bit-- mostly because by spending some cash and being careful how you act, it can go a lot longer than a usual shooty shooty operation that often has more consequences than benefits.

In an effort to develop our Iraqi Army (IA) Brigade, we are attempting to get them to try one of these operations, and today we (my US Battalion Commander and I) tried to pitch the idea to the IA Brigade Commander. We were immediately confronted with resistance.

"That's not the Army's job."
"I don't have any assets to do a project like that."
"I don't have money like the Americans do."
"My Division Commander won't let me."

He pretty much thought up a thousand reasons why he couldn't do it, until we explained an example:

Me: "Saydi (Arabic for sir)-- what's your worst neighborhood?"

IA Brigade Commander: "Al Dorito" (fake name)

Me: "Ok, here's what we do. We go into Al Dorito and your soldiers pick up the trash and use your trucks to haul it away. You get Division to bring in some front end loaders from the Engineer Battalion to scoop up the big piles of trash. We bring in some sewage trucks to suck the sewage out of the streets, and we use your water trucks to hose the streets down. The Americans show up with some pallets of bottled water for the IA to pass out, and along with the water they get a flyer inquiring about some bad people we want to know about with a tip line on it to call if they see anything. We put up a big banner of the failed attempted market bombing where your soldiers stopped the woman from detonating the bomb and she blew herself up instead-- we put up a picture of her looking sad in her hospital bed, again with a tip line. We put up some more signs about how all if this was coordinated by the local government, which is working hard to restore services and make things better, and how the terrorists won't do this for you. Your S2s (intelligence officers) are there to work sources and gather information. Get a band to play music."

Bam. Nonlethal targeting explained.

He sat quietly for a few seconds, and when he realized how it isn't nearly as hard as he makes it out to be, he agreed to do it.

Subsequent meetings were scheduled to plan it out, but it looks like it might work. We'll see.

Hope you are well-- take care.
Ron