Two Angry Theories

Angry theory/ number one: Our risk-averse Army stifles initiative and prevents us from us becoming bold, innovative leaders the Army says it wants because cannot/is afraid to handle the consequences. Policies and rules are good for establishing good order and discipline, but they do not consider individual environments. Division/Brigade/Battalion wide SOPs are necessary; some SOPs and techniques that are regional or theatre wide are needed in a general sense for good order & discipline and, if necessary, to make us modular with other units if we have to conduct an on order mission outside of our local AO with other coalition units. But situations are different in every area, and current “edicts from on high” are too restrictive and thus neuter the initiative of the leader on the ground.

Angry theory number two: Higher ups (“Those guys, ” “Brigade,” “Division,” etc) issue edicts/policies/”standard enduring guidance” because they think because our Army has a great deal of technology that is supposed to clarify the battlefield and deliver “Situational Awareness” to the high commander, therefore he/she believes they are better able to judge the current scene of what is happening on the ground. We have a system called Blue Force Tracker that uses GPS technology to show where equipment is on the ground; we have UAVs that provide a picture to a removed commander of what is happening on the ground. But the systems do not provide the “Situational Awareness” that removed commanders think they do: Blue Force Tracker only shows where the unit is, not what it is involved with, which direction it is looking, how many good guys are on the ground, or how many enemy soldiers it is facing. All it shows is an icon on a screen. UAVs show a soda-straw view of a moment in time and do little to capture the sights, smells, sounds, and feel of the moment, all necessary things that go into the intuitive/subconscious decision making process. All of our technology that is supposed to provide Commanders with full-time situational awareness (and our risk-averseness) prevents us from leading by feel. The Science of warfare overwhelms the Art of warfare.

Until we let go, we won't truly have "empowered free thinking leaders."

I read another Malcom Gladwell book (called "Blink"), and he again contributed to my theory. He uses a scenario of a wargame called Millennium Challenge, which was a wargamed experiment done in 2000. The scenario consisted of a rogue dictator gone mad who made overt threats to neighbor countries in a strategically important area of the world. On the ‘Blue’ side was the US with LOTS of technology, analytical decision making models, big staffs, and lots and lots of metrics, decision support templates and Science of War stuff. On the “Red” side was a retired Marine named Paul Van Riper who truly empowered his subordinate leaders and used decentralized execution to fight. His approaches were extremely innovative to the point where his lo-tech style mitigated the overmatch created by technology. His subordinates were not mired in information, and were able to see things much more clearly. The end result is he handily beat the Blue Force in the wargame. I enjoyed the book a lot and agreed with many of its conclusions.

I should have said this first, but I want to do something over here, but higher rules and regulations prevent me from doing it, even though if I did it, I would be more successful.

That quote “I have seen the enemy, and it is us” applies nicely.

Hope you are well- thanks for reading.
Ron